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Abstract 525
1 Introduction
CPB’s applied general-equilibrium model MIMIC (Gelauff and Graafland, 1994)
focuses on how the tax and social-security system (TSSS) impacts the labor market. In
recent years, numerous proposals for changing the TSSS have been analysed with the
model to inform policy makers on their likely effects. The way unemployment was
affected always played an important part in the decisions on actual reform, because
combatting unemployment was high on the political agenda.
Recently, a revised version of the model has become operational; for a description,
see Graafland and De Mooij (1998). Some parts of the model have been changed on the
basis of recent empirical research; for example, new MIMIC features much higher
export price elasticities, much lower substitution elasticities between capital and labor,
and a new wage bargaining model. Moreover, the model has been extended in several
ways in order to better describe the distortions that come with high marginal taxes; for
example, new MIMIC takes account of the informal economy and of schooling by
employers and employees. Typically, the empirical base for these new parts is relatively
weak.
This paper explores how sensitive new MIMIC’s results are to a number of parameter
changes, concentrating on recent modifications of and additions to the model. In
assessing the robustness of the results it pays special attention to the ranking of
measures in terms of their efficacy in reducing (unskilled) unemployment, like in actual
policy debates.
The contents of the paper are as follows. Section 2 is a brief description of MIMIC.
It also gives an overview of the parameter variations considered in the sensitivity
analysis. Section 3 considers six changes in the TSSS and their effects on a number of
macroeconomic variables according to MIMIC. The core of the paper is Section 4,
which discusses how these effects change when certain parameters are varied. Section
5 concludes. The appendix consists of tables that tell how the effects of the six measures
according to the alternative model versions deviate from MIMIC.
2 Some salient features of MIMIC
2.1 General characteristics
MIMIC uses the applied general-equilibrium methodology. Behavioral equations are
derived from microeconomic models of optimizing agents. The model also includes
macro links by aggregating individual choices over groups of agents and confronting the
results with the behavior of other groups of agents on the goods markets and the labor
market. Agents operating on these markets are firms, households and the public sector.6
MIMIC is typically a model of a small open economy in the sense that, by assumption,
Dutch policies do not affect foreign markets. Foreign products are supplied elastically,
so that domestic demand can always be met at unchanged import prices. The value of
the guilder is linked to the value of the Deutsche Mark. The domestic real interest rate
is exogenous.
MIMIC also comprises some characteristics of New Keynesian Theory. In particular,
whereas domestic goods markets clear, the labor market is characterized by equilibrium
unemployment. Wages are set by negotiations between firms and households. The
resulting wages generally differ from their market clearing levels.
Broadly speaking, MIMIC consists of four submodels which describe, respectively,
firm behavior, household behavior, wage formation and the matching process between
vacancies and unemployment. These are discussed in the subsections below. Then
follow subsections on the public sector, on the data base and calibration, and on the
focus of the sensitivity analysis.
2.2 Firm behavior
The business sector is subdivided into six sectors of industry, of which the sheltered
sector and the exposed sector are the largest ones. The sheltered sector consists of labor-
intensive services facing little competition from abroad. The exposed sector, by contrast,
consists mainly of capital-intensive industries subject to fierce competition from abroad.
The output market environment of all firms is characterized by monopolistic competi-
tion. In particular, firms set their output prices by marking-up marginal cost. Foreign
commodities are imperfect substitutes for domestic commodities. This leaves room for
a positive mark-up, also in the exposed sector. The terms of trade may change when
domestic suppliers adjust their output prices. 
Domestic firms maximize profits subject to a CES production function with five
factor inputs: intermediate goods, capital (which is immobile between sectors), unskilled
labor, low-skilled labor and high-skilled labor. The demand for each factor is positively
related to output and negatively to its relative cost. The distinction of several skill levels
is important for the analysis of  policies targeted at the unskilled, who suffer from a
relatively high rate of unemployment. Firms may also hire labor of each skill on the
informal market. Furthermore, firms may pay their formally employed workers partly
informally ("below the desk"), i.e. by not reporting part of the wages to the tax authority.
The volume of this so-called coupled informal labor rises with the marginal tax burden
on employers. The marginal tax burden on employers affects also the on-the-job training
activities which firms undertake to raise the productivity of their employees. For, if the
firm invests in the human capital of its workers, employees may claim part of the returns
to these investments in the form of a higher net wage rate. A high marginal tax burden7
for the employer makes such wage increases much larger in gross terms. Consequently,
the incentives for firms to invest in the human capital of their workers are low when the
marginal tax rate is high.
2.3 Household behavior
For an adequate description of labor supply per skill level, MIMIC distinguishes forty
types of households. Households are partitioned into couples, single persons, single
parents, pensioners and students. People aged between 55 and 65 years form a separate
group. Couples consist of a so-called breadwinner (i.e., the individual with the higher
personal income) and a partner (the one with the lower personal income). Couples with
children are distinguished from those without children. Elder children with an income
of their own are classified as single persons. Individuals may differ with respect to their
skill level and job status (being employed,  receiving some kind of social benefit, or not
participating). For each type of household, class-frequency income distributions based
on micro data describe the gross incomes of individuals. Application of the relevant
statutory tax and premium rates to these gross incomes yields the net incomes and the
average and marginal tax rates determining labor supply decisions.
Households apply a stepwise optimization procedure. In the first step, they allocate
their incomes optimally to savings and consumption at a given, as yet arbitrary  supply
of labor. The rate of saving depends on the interest rate and the pure rate of time
preference. Consumption is allocated to labor-intensive consumption goods and other
goods. Labor-intensive consumption goods can be bought in the formal and in the
informal economy; the allocation is governed by the relative price. In the second step,
they select the amount of labor supplied from a limited set of discrete options on the
labor market. To illustrate, single persons may choose between four options: A full-time
job, part-time jobs of 40% or 80%, or a job that amounts to 120% of a full-time job.
Breadwinners can choose between 80%, 100% and 120% of a full-time job. Partners
may choose between non-participation and a part-time job of 30%, 50% or 80%. In the
third step, households allocate total labor supply to the formal labor market and the
informal labor market. The participation rate and the number of hours worked in the
formal and informal sector depend on the ratio of the net wages on each of these
markets. The wage on the informal-labor market follows from the equilibrium condition
that demand equals supply.
Households not only supply formal and informal labor, they also produce home
goods (which are perfect substitutes for labor-intensive goods) and invest in their human
capital. Through acquiring skills, households can either raise their productivity within
their own skill group or make their way into a higher skill group. More human capital
yields higher wage incomes in the future. This gain is to be weighed against the8
opportunity cost of training, measured by current wage income foregone. A simple time-
allocation model (see De Mooij, 1997) implies that training activities are proportional
to formal labor supply. Intuitively, if labor supply becomes more attractive compared
to leisure, also other activities that raise (current or future) labor incomes become more
attractive. A higher level of human capital translates into higher labor productivity in
the model of the firm.
2.4 Wage formation
Wage formation in MIMIC is described by a bargaining model (see Graafland and
Huizinga, 1996). The resulting wage equation implies that gross wages are positively
related to the consumer price, the value-added price, and the average tax and premium
burden. A higher replacement rate, too, raises gross wages because it raises the threat
point income of workers. By contrast, wages decrease with the unemployment rate as
it lowers the threat point income of workers. Also the marginal tax rate exerts a negative
influence on wages. For a higher marginal tax rate implies that a given gross-wage
increase generates a smaller net-income increase, thus shifting the trade-off between
employment and gross-wage increases in favor of the former.
The wage equation in MIMIC, though estimated solely on macro data, applies both
to the macro wage and to the three skill-specific wages. The macro wage equation
features macro values for the average tax burden, the marginal tax burden, the
replacement rate and unemployment, whereas skill-specific values are used in the three
skill-specific wage equations. For each skill group, the contractual wage rate is the
arithmetic average of the macro wage outcome and the skill-specific wage outcome.
This specification allows for changing relative contractual wages. The wage structure
may be further modified by forces arising in the skill-specific matching process (see the
next subsection).
2.5 The matching model
The scarcity on the labor market is related to the mismatch between vacancies and
unemployment. Following Pissarides (1990), MIMIC incorporates a market for jobs per
skill type. On this market, unemployed people meet firms that search for suitable
workers to fill their vacancies. The search strategy of the unemployed is described by
two variables, their search intensity and reservation wage. Both variables depend on,
among others things, the replacement rate. Specifically, a higher replacement rate
reduces the number of job matches because it lowers the search intensity and raises the
reservation wage of the unemployed. Accordingly, the mismatch on the labor market
exacerbates. Firms may then economize on the costs of finding appropriate employees9
     
1 That is, not collectively bargained and agreed upon.
     
2 Inclusive of other non-profit enterprises.
by offering an incidental
1 wage increase in order to attract sufficient applicants for their
vacancies. Equilibrium unemployment goes up.
The search strategy of employers is influenced by the minimum wage. Minimum
wages constitute a restriction on the acceptance of unskilled or low-skilled workers as
it induces employers to set a minimal-productivity standard for job applicants. Skill-
specific distribution functions of (match-specific) worker productivity, based on micro
panels of wages, describe the heterogeneity of labor supply within skill groups. A higher
minimum wage reduces the number of candidates who meet the minimal-productivity
standard, particularly among the unskilled. Hence, vacancy duration will increase,
thereby raising the search costs for employers, who then offer incidental wage rises and
reduce their labor demand. Once again, equilibrium unemployment goes up.
The matching model distinguishes short-term from long-term unemployment.
Because the long-term unemployed have lost part of their skills and because they
constitute a very heterogenous group, the distribution function of the productivity of job
matches between vacancies and the long-term unemployed features a relatively low
mean and a relatively high standard deviation. As a result, the long-term unemployed
have a lower probability of meeting the minimal-productivity standard set by employers
and, hence, of obtaining a job.
2.6 The public sector
Government behavior is largely exogenous in MIMIC. The model describes several
institutional features in great detail, for example the statutory income tax system in the
Netherlands as of 1998. The value-added tax (VAT) in the Netherlands consists of a low
rate on necessary goods (6% rate) and a high rate for other goods (17½%), next to a
number of exemptions (mainly products of the medical sector
2). Other institutional
features in MIMIC are the employers’ and employees’ social-security contributions, the
official minimum wage, several social-benefit schemes and a number of policy
instruments targeted at specific groups (for example, the long-term unemployed and the
unskilled).
2.7 Data base and calibration
Values of all variables are obtained from various statistical sources (like National
Accounts, Labor Force Statistics and micro panels). Most behavioral parameters are10
taken from the literature. Some parts of the model, like the one for wage formation, are
estimated on macro data for the Netherlands. Most elasticities of the firm model are
taken from JADE, CPB’s new macroeconometric model (see CPB, 1997). The
elasticities in the household and matching model are based on microeconometric
estimates for the Netherlands reported in the literature. The public sector is based on
institutional data with respect to the structure of the TSSS and public outlays. A special-
purpose data model forces consistency on the statistical description of the Dutch
economy assembled from the various sources. The procedure adopted ensures that
MIMIC reproduces the base-year data set.
2.8 Focus of sensitivity analysis
The first column of Table 1 summarizes the values of a number of important parameters
in the new version of MIMIC. The other columns report the alternative parameter values
considered below. The sensitivity analysis focuses on new elements and on important
changes from the previous version of MIMIC (old MIMIC, for short).
In the first model variant, S.EXPORT, the partial elasticities of substitution between
domestic and foreign goods and services on the export markets have been reduced so as
to approximately obtain the price elasticities in old MIMIC, which can be regarded as
lower bounds in light of the literature. The values in (new) MIMIC derive from recent
research by Draper (1996).
The second model variant, S.CAPLAB, raises the elasticities of substitution between
capital and labor in the production functions from 0.15 (exposed sector) or 0.0 (other
sectors) to 0.75, which seems to be an upperbound in light of the literature. The values
in MIMIC derive from recent research by Draper and Manders (1996).
In the third model variant, S.SKILLS, the partial elasticities of substitution between
unskilled, low-skilled and high-skilled labor have been increased to values which can
be regarded as maximum estimates. 
In the fourth model variant, E.SCHOOL, the marginal-tax rate elasticity of schooling
has been halved. There is hardly an empirical base for this parameter. Schooling is
absent from old MIMIC.
The fifth model variant, S.INF.DEM, raises the partial elasticities of substitution
between the demand for formal and informal labor by firms and the demand for formal
and informal labor-intensive goods by consumers. Although the empirical base is
somewhat stronger than in the former case, here, too,  the empirical reliability of the
values in MIMIC is rather low. The same holds for the wage elasticities of informal
labor supply, which have been doubled in the sixth model variant, S.INF.SUP. Old





























































































































































































































1    S.EXPORT
      S
a exports of goods 3.0 1.25
                       of services 1.75 1.05
2    S.CAPLAB
      S capital-labor
         exposed sector 0.15 0.75
         sheltered sector 0.0 0.75
         construction 0.0 0.75
         medical sector 0.0 0.75
3    S.SKILLS
      S between skills
         exposed sector 1.1 2.0
         sheltered sector 2.0 3.0
         construction 2.0 3.0
         medical sector 1.5 2.5
4    E.SCHOOL
      Marginal-tax rate elasticity
         of schooling by firms 0.2 0.1
5    S.INF.DEM
      S formal-informal in
         factor demand 2.0 2.5
Household model
      S formal-informal in
         consumption demand 2.0 2.5
6    S.INF.SUP
      Wage elasticity informal
         labor supply 0.75 1.5
7    S.FOR.SUPP
      Wage elasticity formal
         labor supply of partners 1.0 0.5
8    S.FOR.SUPB
      Wage elasticity formal
         labor supply breadwinners 0.05 0.1
Wage model
9    W.EMPL
      Bargaining power employers  0.95 0.9
10    W.INF
      Weight informal wage
         in threat point 0.06 0.1
11  W.RPL
      Elasticity of replacement rate 0.25 0.35
12  W.SPEC
      Degree of skill-specific
         contractual wage formation 0.5 1.0
Matching model
13  LU.MEAN
      Mean prod. distr. l.-t. unempl.
         high skilled 0.9 0.8
         low skilled 0.8 0.7
         unskilled 0.8 0.7
14  LU.SD
      St. dev. prod. distr. l.-t. unempl.
         high skilled 0.2 0.15
         low skilled 0.3 0.20














































































































a S denotes a partial elasticity of substitution.
Table 1 Survey of parameter variations12
The seventh model variant, S.FOR.SUPP, reduces the wage elasticity of formal labor
supply by partners to a value that can be regarded as a minimum estimate in light of the
empirical literature.
The eighth model variant, S.FOR.SUPB, raises the wage elasticity of formal labor
supply by breadwinners from 0.05 to 0.10.
The next four model variants all pertain to wage formation, which plays an important
part in all results. In the ninth and tenth model variant two structural parameters of the
wage bargaining model have been changed substantially; the difference with the base
values is more than twice their standard deviations estimated by Graafland and Huizinga
(1998). The ninth model variant, W.EMPL, lowers the relative bargaining power of
employers from 0.95 to 0.90. The tenth model variant, W.INF, raises the weight of the
informal wage in the threat point of workers from 0.06 to 0.10. These two parameter
changes have a strong impact on the (semi-)elasticities of the wage equation. Section
4.4. provides the details.
In the eleventh model variant, W.RPL, the elasticity of the replacement rate in the
wage equation has been raised to 140% of its base value, which seems a maximum in
light of the empirical evidence.
The twelfth model variant, W.SPEC, raises the degree to which contractual wage
bargaining is skill-specific to its maximum value of one. Here, too, the empirical base
of the value chosen for MIMIC is rather weak.
The thirteenth and fourteenth model variant vary the characteristics of the long-term
unemployed. In the thirteenth model variant, LU.MEAN, skill deterioration due to long-
term unemployment has been increased by lowering the mean of the distribution
function of the productivity of the (job matches between vacancies and) long-term
unemployed (which is normalized to 1 for the short-term unemployed) by 0.1. In the
fourteenth model variant, LU.SD, the standard deviations of the productivity distribu-
tions for the long-term unemployed have been lowered to a lower bound, the
corresponding values for the short-term unemployed. The empirical base of the values
used in MIMIC for the means and the standard deviations is weak. Old MIMIC does not
feature the distinction between short-term and long-term unemployment.
Table 1 documents the actual parameter changes.
3 Six measures: Their effects according to MIMIC
MIMIC is used for the analysis of balanced-budget changes in the TSSS. For practical
reasons, the sensitivity analysis in the next section treats only a limited set of six typical
measures:
￿ 1 Lower rate of the first tax bracket (TAX1);
￿ 2 Lower rate of the third tax bracket (TAX3);13
￿ 3 Higher earned-income tax allowance (EITA);
￿ 4 Targeted social-security contribution reduction (SSCR);
￿ 5 Targeted earned-income tax credit (EITC);
￿ 6 Lower VAT rate.
In all cases, the ex-ante reduction of tax revenues equals 0.5 % of GDP. Public
consumption is lowered in order to balance the government’s budget. Endogenous
changes in net tax revenues through behavioral responses of the economic agents are
compensated for by additional changes in public consumption so that budget neutrality
is maintained.
All six measures impact the economy in the following way. The tax reductions boost
real disposable incomes and hence private consumption. Moreover, through their impact
on marginal and average gross and net wages and on the replacement rate they affect
labor supply, labor demand and the level of equilibrium unemployment. The prices of
domestic goods come down. Economic activity goes up, which generates additional tax
revenues. Hence, ex post the cut-back on public consumption is less than 0.5% of GDP.
This general pattern nonwithstanding, many differences of detail exist. This raises
the question how the measures are to be compared. A proper evaluation would account
for the gains of private consumption and the losses of leisure and public consumption
of the socioeconomic groups discerned in the model; maybe it would even attempt a
comprehensive welfare analysis, measuring the net effects of all gains and losses on an
index of social performance, like Van Steen (1997) has done with old  MIMIC.
However, welfare analysis with new MIMIC remains a task for future work. This paper
merely presents the long-term effects of the measures on a limited set of macroeconomic
variables in effect matrices and compares these matrices across model variants. Special
attention will be paid to the effects on the unemployment rate, like in actual policy
debates.
The five subsections below discuss the effects of the six measures according to the
present version of MIMIC. Table 2 is the effect matrix of MIMIC, which will serve as
the reference matrix for the other model variants.
3.1 Reducing income tax rates for low and high incomes
A lower marginal tax rate affects labor supply positively through the substitution effect
(in MIMIC, through substitution towards options with a larger number of hours
supplied). On the other hand, a lower average tax burden affects labor supply negatively
through the income effect. Both with a reduction of the tax rate of the first and the third
bracket, the aggregate substitution effect dominates the aggregate income effect (see the
first two columns of Table 1). Through the substitution effect, a reduction of the tax rate
of the first bracket stimulates labor supply by people earning low incomes, mainly to be14
found among the unskilled, youngsters (included in the group of single persons when
still living with their parents) and particularly partners, many of whom work in part-time
jobs. Through the income effect, it reduces the labor supply of breadwinners and older
workers, many of whom face the tax rate of the second or third bracket at the margin.
The latter effect is smaller than the first one. A reduction of the tax rate of the third
bracket, on the contrary, reduces labor supply of many partners through the income
effect (net breadwinners’ incomes go up) but raises the labor supply of people with high
incomes, mainly breadwinners and older workers, through the substitution effect.
Although the (uncompensated) wage elasticity of these groups’ labor supply is much
lower than those of partners’, the effect on total labor supply is still sizeable due to the
magnitude of the groups affected.
Lower tax rates cause substitution from informal to formal labor, both on the demand
side and on the supply side of the labor market. This substitution effect outweighs the
positive demand effects resulting from higher production and private consumption. The
first measure has a much smaller negative effect on the volume of informal labor than
the second one for the following reason. Unlike the second measure, the first one has a
rather large positive effect on partners’ labor supply. Consequently, household
production falls; the compensating increase in the demand for child care and labor-
intensive services boosts the demand for informal labor. Therefore, the positive demand
effect is relatively large, compensating for a greater part of the negative substitution
effect.
Higher net wages raise the gains from training activities like they raise the gains from
working. Hence, the time spent on training rises with labor supply. The additional
human capital raises labor productivity.
Gross wages fall on impact due to the lower average tax burden. Moreover, the rise
in aggregate labor supply strengthens the bargaining position of employers, which
creates additional downward pressure on wages. By contrast, the fall of the marginal tax
burden raises wages. On net, wages fall (this applies to the other four measures as well).
Lower wage costs lead to lower output prices. As a result, the competitive position
of Dutch firms relative to foreign competitors improves, both on domestic and on
foreign markets. Exports rise, and the import content of domestic demand declines.
Higher real disposable incomes raise private consumption. Output and employment go
up, unemployment comes down. Ex post, the government must reduce public
consumption by only 0.3% of GDP in order to balance its budget.
The first measure favors low-income groups, such as the unskilled, and improves
their relative labor market position: The drop in the unskilled gross wage rate exceeds
the average drop, the increase of unskilled employment exceeds the average increase,
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Informal market 0.8 1.8 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.0
Volumes
Private consumption 1.2 1.2 1.4 0.8 1.1 1.1
Exports of goods 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.5 0.8 0.4
Value added (enterpr.) 0.7 0.6 1.1 0.5 1.0 0.6
Employment in enterpr. 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.4
Labor supply (pers.) 0.1
￿ 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.0
Labor supply (hours) 0.2 0.2 0.1
￿ 0.2 0.1 0.0
￿  partners 0.5




￿ 0.2 6.2 3.1
￿ 0.4



























































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.
Table 2 Effect matrix of MIMIC
variables are not shown in the table); hence, the fall of the unskilled unemployment rate
exceeds the average fall. The second measure favors high-income groups. Still, also in16
     
3 It must be borne in mind that equiproportional changes of the unemployment rates imply a relatively
large absolute change of the unskilled unemployment rate simply because it is twice as high as the other
rates on the base path.
this case the fall of the unskilled unemployment rate exceeds the average fall. The
reason is completely different, however: A less than average rise of unskilled
employment is more than offset by a fall of unskilled labor supply.
3
3.2 Increasing the earned-income tax allowance
In the Netherlands, the earned-income tax allowance is 12% of gross labor income up
to a certain treshold. In 1998, the maximal deduction of about 3,100 guilders is reached
at the treshold income of around 26,000 guilders. The third column of Table 1 presents
the effects of raising the percentage deduction while maintaining the treshold income.
This measure boosts the labor supply of partners because it reduces the marginal tax rate
on part-time jobs. Most people with a full-time job, however, earn incomes exceeding
the treshold and deduct the maximal allowance. So, whereas their average tax burden
diminishes, their marginal tax burden remains the same.
The negative effect on the volume of informal labor is small, as with the first
measure. The same explanation applies in both cases.
Benefit recipients do not profit from this measure, only the employed  do. Therefore,
the replacement rate drops substantially. Moreover, the fall of the average burden is
relatively large. Both factors contribute to the large negative effect on wages compared
to the first two measures, leading to even lower prices and higher volumes of final
demand and output. The unemployment rate goes down by 0.5%-point. The ex-post
reduction of public consumption is a mere 0.2% of GDP.
In relative terms, low-income groups gain more from the higher allowance than high-
income groups do. By consequence, the labor market position of the unskilled improves.
Unskilled employment rises so strongly that, in spite of the fact that unskilled labor
supply rises more than the average, the unskilled unemployment rate falls by more than
the average unemployment rate does.
3.3 Targeted reductions of social-security contributions of employers
The measures considered thus far, as well as the sixth one, apply to all tax payers alike,
although some of them may profit more than others do. The measures discussed in this
and the next subsection, however, are targeted at low-wage workers. They attempt to17
raise either the demand for or the supply of unskilled labor by targeted reductions of the
labor costs for firms or the taxes on low-wage incomes, respectively.
The prevailing system gives employers a rebate on the SSC for workers on low
hourly wage rates (the so-called SPAK). The maximal allowance is 3,660 guilders a year
for workers at the minimum wage level. The allowance gradually falls to zero for
workers earning 115% (121%) of the gross minimum wage at a working time of 36 (38)
hours a week. The fourth measure raises the SPAK by 6,000 guilders for a worker at the
minimum wage, while the treshold where this additional allowance is zero is 130% of
the minimum wage.
As the fourth column of Table 1 shows, the targeted SSC reduction is more effective
in fighting unemployment, particularly unskilled unemployment, than the measures
discussed above are. The lower labor costs for low-wage workers raise the employment
of unskilled persons through two channels. First, they induce firms to substitute
unskilled labor for high-skilled labor. Second, they reduce the minimal-productivity
standard set by firms, that is the individual productivity below which an unskilled
person is not an acceptable candidate for any vacancy posted by firms. So, a larger share
of the unskilled unemployed becomes gainfully employable. Moreover, as the net wages
of the unskilled rise, the unskilled replacement rate falls; this raises the search intensity
of the unskilled and thus improves the efficiency of the job matching process.
However, the targeted SSC reduction has some drawbacks as well. The gradual
decline of the tax allowance means that employers face a high marginal tax rate for their
low-wage workers. This affects firms’ training activities for the unskilled negatively;
hence, the productivity of unskilled workers lags behind and less of them are promoted
to the rank of the low-skilled. This helps explain why employment rises more than
output does (next to substitution from high-skilled to unskilled labor), which is one
feature that sets this measure (and the next one) apart from the other four measures.
Second, the high marginal tax burden for employers provokes substitution from formal
to coupled informal labor. Instead of raising their formal wages, firms may compensate
low-wage workers with payments "below the desk", thus not loosing part of the SSC
reduction. This substitution towards informal labor explains also why (formal) labor
supply measured in hours declines. Third, the reduction of the number of unemployment
benefits lags far behind the reduction of the number of unemployed, because low-paid
workers are concentrated in the groups of married women and of young single persons,
who are generally not entitled to a social benefit. These adverse effects mitigate the
favorable effects of the targeted SSC reduction.18
     
4 The EITC in the American tax system is related to yearly household wage income.
3.4 Introducing a targeted earned-income tax credit
The fifth column of Table 2 presents the effects of a targeted earned-income tax credit.
Like the targeted SSC reduction, the targeted EITC varies with the hourly wage rate of
an employee. The maximal credit applies at the hourly minimum wage; it declines
linearly to zero at the minimum wage plus 30%.
4
Of all measures considered in this paper, the targeted EITC gives the strongest boost
to the participation rate: Unskilled and low-skilled partners are stimulated to supply
labor as the average tax burden on part-time jobs with low hourly wages drops.
However, the effect on hours supplied is rather small for two reasons: Because
breadwinners reduce their (formal) supply due to the positive effect on their partners’
incomes through the tax credit and the participation rate, and because of substitution
towards informal labor (see below).
Targeting the EITC at low-wage workers implies a relatively large fall of the
replacement rate and the average tax burden of the unskilled. Through the skill-specific
element in wage formation, this translates into a relatively large decline of the unskilled
wage rate. Furthermore, the lower replacement rate for unskilled workers raises their
search intensity and lowers their reservation wage. Hence, the efficiency of the matching
process for unskilled labor improves. Unskilled unemployment drops more substantially
than total unemployment does.
The targeted EITC shares several drawbacks with the targeted SSC reduction for
employers. Through the higher marginal tax burden, it discourages training efforts by
workers and provokes substitution from formal to coupled informal labor.
The targeted EITC is less effective in reducing unskilled unemployment than the
targeted SSC reduction for the following reason. A match between a vacancy and an
unemployed person may not come about either because the reservation wage exceeds
the wage offer or because the unemployed’s productivity does not meet the firm’s
minimal-productivity standard, which is directly related to the total labor costs at the
minimum wage level. Both measures raise the efficiency of the matching process for the
unskilled because they lower the replacement rate of the unskilled, the targeted EITC
even more so than the targeted SSC reduction. However, in most cases where a match
does not come about, the blame is on the minimal-productivity standard (see Jongen and
Graafland, Table 9). So what matters most is that the targeted EITC does not lower total
labor costs at the statutory minimum wage level while the targeted SSC reduction does.19
3.5 Reducing the VAT rate
The sixth measure is a reduction of the VAT rate. Actually, one issue in current policy
debates is a shift from direct to indirect taxes. A real-life tax reform may therefore
consist of a combination of (minus) this measure with some of the others.
On impact, a lower VAT rate reduces consumer prices, thus raising real disposable
incomes. It stimulates labor supply because the substitution effect dominates the income
effect. However, since all household types and income groups benefit equally from the
fall in the consumer price, the keeping-up-with-the-Jones effect tempers the rise of labor
supply; in fact, labor supply hardly changes at all. Many other effects are very similar
to those of the first and second measure, a natural exception being the larger fall of the
consumer price.
4 Sensitivity analysis
4.1 What information to present?
Parameter changes affect the reduced form of MIMIC and lead to different effect
matrices of tax policy variants. However, many changes in effects will not be
interesting, because they are small either in absolute terms or in relative terms. The main
text focuses on differences in effects that, after rounding, are at least 0.2 in absolute
value. When many differences of interest exist, they are presented in the form of a
difference matrix, that is the difference between the effect matrix of the model variant
concerned and that of MIMIC itself. However, in most cases only a single column or
row or just a few isolated cells differ significantly (in the sense just defined), so that a
verbal description suffices. The reader who wants to judge for himself may consult the
appendix, which contains the difference matrices (with their entries rounded to one
decimal) of all model variants. The subsections 4.2-5 discuss the difference matrices of
the alternative model versions. Subsection 4.6 presents an overview across model
variants by comparing the impact of the parameter variations on how (unskilled)
unemployment is affected by the six tax changes.
4.2 Elasticities of the model of firm behavior
4.2.1 Export price elasticities (S.EXPORT)
Table 3 is the difference matrix for S.EXPORT, that is the model version with lower
substitution elasticities between domestic and foreign goods and services on foreign20
     
5 However, other measures, for example a reduction of the corporate tax rate, will lead to significantly
different outcomes in S.CAPLAB.
markets. The implied export price elasticities go down from 2.7 for goods and 1.6 for
services to 1.1 and 0.95, respectively, approximating  their values in old MIMIC. Other
research (Nieuwenhuis, 1995) has taught that the values of the export price elasticities
have a large impact on the model’s reduced form. The present results confirm this
finding: The difference matrix contains many non-negligible entries. The effects on
prices and volumes are intuitive. All measures reduce the wage rate and hence prices.
Naturally, the induced export expansions are smaller in S.EXPORT than in MIMIC.
Hence, the upward pressure on prices is smaller as well, so that prices fall by more than
in MIMIC. This result holds at an unchanged base path. In fact, the change in the export
price elasticities leads to a rather different base path, featuring lower unemployment. At
a lower level of unemployment, an unemployment fall gives rise to more wage pressure.
So, the non-linearity of the wage curve weakens the negative effects on wages and
prices at the new base path. The negative effects on output and employment are
mitigated as imports, too, fall by more. Only in case of the third measure (higher earned-
income tax allowance) is the change in the effects on value added and employment
worth mentioning (that is, at the chosen criterium).
The effects on the marginal burden in experiments 2 and 4 and those on the
replacement rate in experiments 4 and 5 are caused by compositional effects on
employment due to shifts between the exposed and sheltered sectors induced by the
lower export price elasticities.
4.2.2 Substitution elasticities between capital and labor (S.CAPLAB)
Raising the partial elasticities of substitution between capital and aggregate labor from
0.15 (exposed sector) or 0.0 (other sectors) to 0.75 hardly affects the effect matrix. All
six measures lead to a lower level of investment for S.CAPLAB than for MIMIC, but
not in a degree worth mentioning. A greater scope for substitution is not a sufficient
reason for substantial substitution to occur, relative factor price change is a necessary
condition. As the cumulated share of labor in investment is about 70%, the price ratio
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a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.
Table 3 Difference Matrix for S.EXPORT22
     
6 That is, holding aggregate labor constant, rather than output.
     
7 Unless of course this higher flexibility caused firms to substitute away completely from a (relatively
expensive) production factor. In that case a change in the price of that production factor will cause more
substantial changes at the less flexible firm.
4.2.3 Substitution elasticities between skill classes of labor (S.SKILLS)
Table 4 shows the effects of increasing the (conditional
6) partial elasticities of
substitution between skill types of labor with 1 point (see Table 1 for the exact values).
This caused problems with solving the model for the second experiment which are
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss.
Higher substitution elasticities mean that firms have more flexibility to react to price
changes. Hence, one would expect larger
7 volume effects of price changes. As Table 4
shows, the SSC reduction and EITC experiments, which are targeted at the bottom of
the labor market, do actually yield larger falls in the unemployment rate. The bias in the
reduction of wages towards the unskilled that characterizes these measures has stronger
effects due to the higher substitution elasticities.
At first sight, it seems puzzling that the wage rates fall by more in experiments 4 and
5 due to the higher substitution elasticities. As these elasticities do not affect the
employers’ fall back position, one would expect the greater flexibility on the employers’
side to elicit stronger quantity responses and hence smaller price changes. However, in
the base path of S.SKILLS unskilled unemployment is far higher than in the MIMIC
base path. So, the non-linearity of the wage curve mentioned in Section 4.2.1 plays a
role here, too. At the higher initial unemployment level, a fall in unemployment
generates less upward pressure on wages.
Due to the fact that the wage rates fall significantly more (in experiments 4-5) in
S.SKILLS than in MIMIC, the other prices fall more as well. Consequently, final-
demand expansions are stronger, employment gains are more pronounced and
unemployment declines more sharply.
The larger fall in wages makes the formal economy more competitive compared to
the informal economy, hence the fall in informal labor.
The stronger fall of the replacement rate with the EITC results from the changed
composition of unemployment. The replacement rate is a weighted average of the
replacement rates of the different groups of unemployed. The EITC lowers the
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Private consumption 0.2 0.4
Exports of goods 0.4 0.7
Value added (enterpr.) 0.2 0.4 0.8







































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.
Table 4 Difference Matrix for S.SKILLS
4.2.4 Marginal-tax rate elasticity of schooling by firms (E.SCHOOL)
Schooling provided by firms, in particular their efforts aimed at raising the productivity
of the unskilled, is adversely affected by the targeted SSC reduction because small net24
     
8 That is, in the base year 1993. These elasticities are not constant, so there is no garantee that the ratio
of two is maintained over the whole simulation period.
wage rises require large gross wage rises due to the high marginal tax rate over the
interval from 100% to 130% of the statutory minimum wage rate. Empirical knowledge
on the marginal-tax rate elasticity of schooling is very scarce indeed. Halving this
elasticity reduces the negative effect on the human capital index and hence on
productivity by 0.2%; concomitantly, the rise of value added is 0.2% higher than in
MIMIC. The other measures do not feature these changes of effects simply because they
alter the marginal tax rate to a much lower degree.
4.2.5 Substitution elasticities between formal and informal sector
  (S.INF.DEM)
This variant combines some parameter changes in the firm model with some in the
household model. First, it features higher elasticities of substitution between formal
labor and informal coupled labor in the production functions. Second, the elasticities of
substitution between formal and informal labor-intensive services in the utility functions
are higher as well. The four measures 1, 2, 3 and 6 cause substitution from the informal
to the formal economy, the two measures 4 and 5 the other way around. With the higher
elasticities of substitution, these effects are larger in absolute value. The entries on the





￿ 0.2, respectively. Because the size of the informal economy is only 3% of the
size of the formal economy, a shift from one to the other will generally be large relative
to the informal economy but still small relative to the formal economy. This explains
why so many entries of the difference matrix are negligibly small.
4.3 Elasticities of the model of household behavior
4.3.1 Wage elasticity of informal labor supply (S.INF.SUP)
Other parameters affecting the trade-off between the formal and the informal economy
are the wage elasticities of informal labor supply. In S.INF.SUP, these elasticities are
set at twice their values in MIMIC.
8
Raising the wage elasticities of informal labor supply leads to a larger volume of
informal labor in the EITC and SSC reduction experiments as these raise the marginal
tax rates substantially in their phase-out ranges. The higher elasticities mean that
workers move more readily from formal to informal labor supply in response to the25
higher marginal tax rates. In the informal-labor row of the difference matrix, the entries
in the fourth column (SSC reduction) and fifth column (EITC) are 0.2 and 1.9,
respectively. In the EITC experiment, the increase of unskilled informal labor supply
is so substantial that  unskilled labor supply is reduced here compared to MIMIC. This
translates into a larger fall of the unskilled unemployment rate, by 0.4%-point more than
in MIMIC.
4.3.2 Wage elasticity of partners’ labor supply (S.FOR.SUPP)
Halving the wage elasticities of partners’ labor supply leads to an effect matrix with
entries smaller in absolute value than for MIMIC on the row for partners’ labor supply.
The entries of the difference matrix are, respectively, 
￿ 0.3, 0.2, 
￿ 0.2, 
￿ 0.2, 
￿ 0.6 and 0.0.
In case of the EITC experiment, the difference is so large that there are notable
differences in the effects on total labor supply, employment and value added as well
(down by 0.1-0.2%-point); because the unskilled are overrepresented among partners,
the unskilled unemployment rate is further reduced by 0.3%-point compared to MIMIC.
4.3.3 Wage elasticity of breadwinners’ labor supply (S.FOR.SUPB)
Not surprisingly, doubling the wage elasticity of breadwinners’ labor supply, from 0.05
to 0.10, only affects the TAX3-column of the effect matrix, but even here the differences
with MIMIC are small. Labor supply and employment go up by an additional 0.1%.
Prices are slightly lower and volumes slightly higher.
4.4 Parameters of the wage model
In MIMIC, like in most macroeconomic models, wage formation is a crucial determi-
nant of many results, and a sensitivity analysis would not be complete if it did not vary
the wage equation. MIMIC contains a structural bargaining model that implies an
exactly identified wage equation which has been estimated on macroeconomic time
series data. Several features of the wage equation are worth mentioning. First, the
elasticities of the average and marginal tax rate sum to the elasticity of the consumer
price. Second, the elasticities of the consumer price and value-added price sum to one.
Third, the bargaining model implies that the elasticities of the replacement rate and
unemployment rate are interrelated. The elasticity of the unemployment rate rises
towards zero as the replacement rate rises towards one; at low unemployment, the
elasticity of the replacement rate is small. Fourth, the wage is proportional to
productivity.26
The wage equation is non-linear in three structural parameters. The two important
ones are the relative bargaining power of employers and the weight of the informal wage
in the threat point of workers; for details, see Graafland and Huizinga (1996). Table 5
indicates how the elasticities of the average and marginal tax rate, the consumer price,
the value-added price, the replacement rate and the unemployment rate vary with these
parameters. The first column of Table 5 presents the parameter estimates of the macro
wage equation. At a given marginal tax rate, the average tax rate affects the wage
positively: Higher taxes increase the relative attractiveness of working in the informal
sector, thereby raising the bargaining position of the worker. By contrast, at a given
average tax rate, the marginal tax rate affects the wage negatively, because higher
marginal taxes reduce the attractiveness of gross wage increases relative to employment
gains for the workers. 
Both the relative bargaining power of employers and the weight of the informal wage
in the threat point of workers have a very small standard error. Small changes in either
of them, as in the second and third column of Table 5, imply rather different values of
Model variant MIMIC W.EMPL W.INF
Parameters
 bargaining power employers 0.953  0.9
 weight informal wage 0.06  0.1
Implied elasticities in 1990
 average tax rate 0.67 0.48 0.75




 consumer price  0.55 0.35 0.67
 value-added price 0.45 0.65 0.33







Table 5 The wage equation27
     
9 This change exceeds twice the standard error of the estimate, which is only 0.015.
     
10 The model-minded reader is referred to CPB (1997, pp. 14-15) which presents a semi-reduced form
equation for the unemployment rate featuring the term  
￿ c . t / d, where c is the elasticity of the average tax
rate t and d is the semi-elasticity of the unemployment rate in the wage equation. 
the (semi-)elasticities, as appears from the lower part of the table. The sensitivity
analysis considers these alternative parameter values as well as alternative values for the
elasticity of the replacement rate and the degree of collective wage bargaining.
4.4.1 Bargaining power of employers (W.EMPL)
A smaller relative bargaining power of employers in the wage negotiations, down from
0.95 to 0.90,
9 is equivalent to a larger relative bargaining power of workers. Conse-
quently, the bargaining result is farther removed from the threat point of workers:
Wages are higher on the new base path. This leads to higher prices, lower volumes of
demand and production, lower employment and higher unemployment rates.
Whereas this parameter change has a large impact on the model’s base path, it hardly
affects the effects of the six tax policy variants. W.EMPL features a higher elasticity of
the value-added price, an unchanged elasticity of the marginal tax rate, and lower
elasticities of the remaining variables. Most importantly, the elasticities of the average
tax rate and the unemployment rate go down equiproportionally. On impact, a given
reduction of the average tax rate lowers wages less in W.EMPL than in MIMIC.
However, the counteracting feed-back through lower unemployment is less strong as
well.
10
With the targeted SSC reduction, the negative effects on prices are somewhat larger
than for MIMIC. This is due to the non-linearity of the wage equation mentioned before:
At higher unemployment rates a given reduction of unemployment generates less wage
pressure. Almost all effects on prices and quantities are not worth mentioning. The sole
exception is the positive effect on value added, which rises by 0.2%.
With the targeted EITC, the lower elasticities of the average tax burden and the
replacement rate explain why wages, especially those of the unskilled, fall by less than
in MIMIC.The drop of the unskilled unemployment rate is reduced from 2.3% to 1.4%.
The replacement rate ends up 0.2% higher due to the changed composition of
unemployment, as a result both of the new base path and of the lower drop of unskilled
unemployment.28
     
11 This change equals twice the standard error of the estimate.
4.4.2 Weight of informal wage in workers’ threat point (W.INF)
A larger weight of the informal wage in the threat point of workers, up from 0.06 to
0.10,
11 hardly affects the base path because the relative bargaining power of workers is
low. It does affect, however, the elasticities of the wage equation. It reduces the
elasticities of the replacement rate and the unemployment rate as the weight of the
formal wage is now lower. Moreover, it lowers the elasticity of the marginal tax rate.
Most importantly, it raises the ratio of the elasticities of the average tax burden (and the
consumer price) and the unemployment rate. Compared to MIMIC, on impact the effect
of a given tax reduction is larger, while the counteracting feed-back effects through
lower unemployment are less strong. Therefore, the six tax policy measures are more
powerfull in W.INF.
Table 6 is the difference matrix for W.INF. The fourth column is lacking because of
solution problems for the targeted SSC reduction. The general pattern is larger
downward effects on prices and larger upward effects on quantities; the unemployment
rate is down by an additional 0.5%-point for the targeted EITC and by 0.2-0.3%-point
for the other measures. The targeted EITC is now so effective in boosting production
and employment that the measure "pays for itself" through higher tax revenues: Public
consumption need not be reduced at all in order to balance the budget.
4.4.3 Elasticity of the replacement rate (W.RPL)
The implemented version of the wage bargaining model features an additional parameter
that scales down the elasticity of the replacement rate to about 0.25 in the base version
of MIMIC. W.RPL restores the elasticity of the replacement to 0.35, the value implied
by the parameter estimates of the wage equation. Naturally, this change affects strongest
the effects of the measures 3, 4 and 5, because they alter the replacement rate more than
the other measures considered. But even in case of the EITC, which lowers the
replacement rate most, there is only one significant element in the difference matrix:
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Private consumption 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2
Exports of goods 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.3
Value added (enterpr.) 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.4











































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.
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Private consumption 0.2 0.2
Exports of goods 0.2 0.2
Value added (enterpr.) 0.3 0.3




































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.
Table 7 Difference Matrix for W.SPEC
4.4.4 Degree of collective wage bargaining (W.SPEC)
As already mentioned in Section 2.4, MIMIC applies the wage equation not only to the
macro wage rate but also to the wage rates of the three skill groups and defines each
skill group’s (contractual) wage as the arithmetic average of the macro result and the31
skill-specific result. W.SPEC eliminates the collective element from wage bargaining,
on each submarket is now governed by skill-specific variables (except, of course, for the
consumer price and value-added price). A model version with purely collective wage
bargaining yields effects opposite in sign but otherwise rather similar to W.SPEC.
Table 7 is the difference matrix for W.SPEC. Quite predictably, the targeted SSC
reduction and EITC are now even more effective in reducing (unskilled) unemployment
than in MIMIC. Wages (and prices) decline somewhat more strongly, the volumes of
private consumption, exports, value added and (unskilled) employment rise somewhat
more strongly.
For a long time, wage bargaining in the Netherlands has been strongly centralized.
Still, relative wages do have changed. There is little empirical evidence on the strength
of skill-specific elements in wage formation. Undoubtedly, however, W.SPEC errs on
the strong side. MIMIC would seem to occupy a save middle ground.
4.5 Characteristics of the long-term unemployed
4.5.1 Mean of the productivity distribution (LU.MEAN)
MIMIC assumes that long-term unemployment causes a mean productivity loss of 10%
for the high-skilled and of 20% for the unskilled and low-skilled. LU.MEAN raises
these average productivity losses to 20%, 30% and 30%, respectively. The difference
matrix for this case features four items which are at least 0.2 in absolute value, in the
columns 4 (targeted SSC reduction) and 5 (targeted EITC). In particular, informal labor
rises by 0.2%-point more compared to MIMIC. Further, these two measures become
more effective in reducing unskilled unemployment: With the SSC reduction the
difference is 
￿ 0.5, with the EITC it is 
￿ 0.2.
The reason why the SSC reduction and EITC become more effective in reducing
unskilled unemployment is the following. The greater loss of productivity due to long-
term unemployment increases the number of unemployed at the bottom of the labor
market, that is precisely where the SSC reduction and EITC are targeted. Naturally, a
rise in the number of unemployed at the bottom of the labor market makes these
measures more effective.
Note, however, that the size of the productivity loss due to long-term unemployment
affects how effective these measures are. To see this, consider the following (extreme)
example. If the productivity loss is so great that even the SSC reduction cannot make
it profitable for firms to hire long-term unemployed at the minimum wage, this measure
becomes less effective instead of more effective in reducing unskilled unemployment.
Similarly, with such a productivity loss the EITC may not suffice to offer workers a net32
     
12 The distinction between short-term and long-term unemployment is a novel feature of MIMIC that
was introduced in order to analyse the effects of vouchers for the long-term unemployed as proposed by
Snower (see Jongen and Graafland, 1998). In MIMIC itself, this measure reduces the unskilled wage rate
by 1.6%, increases unskilled employment by 6.2%, and lowers the unskilled unemployment rate by 4.2%-
point. LU.MEAN reinforces these effects by 2.0%, 3.0% and 2.0%-point, respectively. Most other
differences are negligible.
     
13 Like a higher mean, a  lower standard deviation of the productivity loss raises the efficacy of vouchers
to combat unskilled unemployment, but the difference with MIMIC is only 0.3%-point.
wage above their reservation wage. To summarize, increasing the productivity loss due
to long-term unemployment increases the efficacy of SSC and EITC measures up to a
certain point, beyond which further productivity losses reduce their efficacy.
The larger effect on informal labor is due to the fact that the reduction in average
productivity causes more workers to be affected by the higher marginal tax rates that go
with the SSC reduction and the EITC. Hence, more employers and workers face the
temptation of demanding or supplying informal labor.
12
4.5.2 Standard deviation of the productivity distribution (LU.SD)
LU.SD lowers the standard deviations of the log-productivity distributions of the long-
term unemployed to those that apply to the labor force at large (see Table 1 for the
details). As in the case of the rise of the productivity loss above, a reduction in the
spread of the productivity distribution of the long-term unemployed raises the number
of individuals in the region affected by the SSC reduction and EITC. Therefore, in these
experiments, the unskilled unemployment rate is more reduced than in MIMIC. In
particular, the difference in the effect on unskilled unemployment for the SSC reduction
is 
￿ 0.3 (for the EITC, the difference is not worth mentioning). As long as the average
productivity of the long-term unemployed lies in the region affected by the SSC
reduction and EITC, a reduction in the spread of the productivity loss always raises the
efficacy of these measures to combat unskilled unemployment.
13
4.6 Overview: The effects on (unskilled) unemployment
This subsection provides an overview across model variants. In doing so, it concentrates
on differences in the effects on the (unskilled) unemployment rate. The entries of Table
8 and Table 9 are rounded to one decimal; a blank corresponds to 0.0.
Three model variants appear to lead to rather different results for unemployment:
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Model variant absolute changes








1   EXPORT 0.1 0.1
2   S.CAPLAB




4   E.SCHOOL
5   S.INF.DEM
6   S.INF.SUP
7   S.FOR.SUPP




























































































a Entries less than 0.1 in absolute value (after rounding) have been deleted.
Table 8 Survey sensitivity analysis: The effects on unemployment
formation is modelled for the simulation results. The largest differences occur with the
targeted SSC reduction and EITC. Quite naturally, in case of targeted measures the
substitution possibilities between skills impact the outcomes. The other parameter
changes considered in this paper do not affect the results for unemployment strongly.
As to wage formation, the estimates of the relative bargaining power of employers
and the weight of the informal wage in the threat point of workers have small standard
errors and the alternative values considered here are extreme in the sense that they are
outside or on the border of the 95%-confidence intervals. The strength of the skill-
specific element in wage formation is, however, rather uncertain. Here, too, the
alternative considered is extreme. In all three cases, the figures in Tables 8 and 9
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1  S.EXPORT 0.1 0.1
￿ 0.1
2  S.CAPLAB



















































































































a Entries less than 0.1 in absolute value (after rounding) have been deleted.
Table 9 Survey sensitivity analysis: The effects on unskilled unemployment
MIMIC accords with the empirical evidence; the alternative substitution elasticities
considered here seem to represent an extreme case.
5 Conclusions
This paper has explored how sensitive new MIMIC’s results are to a number of
parameter changes. It has concentrated on parameters that have been changed from the
previous version of the model, like the export price elasticities and the elasticities of the
wage model, and on parameters relating to model extensions, like the incorporation of
the informal economy and of schooling provided by firms.35
In no case do the parameter variations considered affect the order of efficacy in
combatting unemployment. This finding is reassuring, as the predicted effects on
unemployment have played an important part in decisions to reform of the tax and
social-security system.
Of the fourteen (sets of) parameter variations considered, only two have a strong
overall impact on the effects of six typical tax policy measures. These are S.EXPORT,
with lower export price elasticities, and W.INF, with a larger weight of the informal
wage in the threat point income of workers in wage bargaining. Only in the latter case
are the effects on unemployment affected strongly. In both cases, the parameter values
of MIMIC are based on recent empirical research.
Two other parameter changes affect strongly the effects of measures targeted at the
unskilled. These are S.SKILLS, with larger substitution elasticities between the three
skill groups of labor, and W.SPEC, with purely skill-specific wage formation. The
parameter uncertainty is greater here.
The remaining parameter variations affect only a few rows or just a few isolated cells
of the effect matrix appreciably. Examples are S.CAPLAB, with larger substitution
elasticities between capital and labor, which affects the results for investments of all six
measures, E.SCHOOL, with a lower marginal-tax rate elasticity of schooling provided
by firms, which affects the results for the human capital index and value added, and
S.INF.DEM, with larger substitution elasticities between the formal and the informal
economy, which affects the prices and volumes in the informal economy.
This paper has considered only a limited set of parameter variations and a limited set
of policy measures, and it refrains from jumping to general conclusions. The model user
must always bear the uncertainty of the model outcomes in mind. Whenever he feels that
the results of a particular policy proposal crucially depend on some parameters, he better
perform a sensitivity analysis taylored to the problem at hand.36
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￿ 0.1 0.3 0.6
Labor supply (pers.)
Labor supply (hours) 0.1
￿ unskilled 0.4 0.5


































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.
Table A.1 Difference Matrix for S.EXPORT













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6





























































































































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6



































































































Informal market 0.1 0.2
Volumes
Private consumption 0.1 0.2 0.4
Investments in equipm. 0.1 0.4 0.8
Exports of goods 0.1 0.4 0.7
Value added (enterpr.) 0.2 0.4 0.8
Employment in enterpr. 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.9
￿ unskilled 0.1 0.7 3.0 4.5 0.1
Labor supply (pers.)
Labor supply (hours) 0.1
￿ unskilled 0.4 0.4
Informal labor (hours) 0.1 0.1
￿ 1.0
￿ 0.3




































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6


























































































Exports of goods 0.1
































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.
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a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6

































































































































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6















































































& unskilled 0.1 0.4


























































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6


























































































Exports of goods 0.1
Value added (enterpr.) 0.1
Employment in enterpr. 0.1
( unskilled
Labor supply (pers.)
Labor supply (hours) 0.1
( unskilled
( 0.1



























































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6




























































































Exports of goods 0.1
Value added (enterpr.) 0.2





































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6












































































































Informal market 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Volumes
Private consumption 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2
Investments 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.2
Exports of goods 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.3
Value added (enterpr.) 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.4
Employment in enterpr. 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.8 0.3





















































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6



























































































Exports of goods 0.1
Value added (enterpr.) 0.1

































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6






























































































Informal market 0.1 0.2
Volumes
Private consumption 0.2 0.2
Investments 0.2 0.2
Exports of goods 0.2 0.2
Value added (enterpr.) 0.3 0.3
Employment in enterpr. 0.3 0.4











































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6

































































































































































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.













































































Measure 1 2 3 4 5 6



















































































Informal market 0.1 0.1
Volumes
Private consumption 0.1 0.1 0.1
Investments 0.1 0.1
Exports of goods 0.1 0.1
Value added (enterpr.) 0.1 0.1 0.1
Employment in enterpr. 0.1






























































































a Weighted average of individuals' burdens.
b Closure rule, in percentage of GDP.
Table A.14 Difference Matrix for LU.SD52
Abstract
CPB’s applied general-equilibrium model MIMIC focuses on how the tax and social-
security system impacts the labor market. Recently, a (preliminary) new model version
has been completed. This paper explores the sensitivity of its results to a number of
parameter changes, focusing on new elements and important changes from the previous
version, and paying special attention to how the effects on (unskilled) unemployment
are affected. The parameters varied include substitution elasticities of the production
functions, labor supply elasticities, export price elasticities, coefficients characterizing
the wage formation process, and characteristics of the long-term unemployed. Few
changes have a strong overall impact on the effects of the (admittedly limited) set of tax
changes considered. Usually, the impact is confined to a specific measure or to a small
set of variables. In no case is the ranking of the measures in terms of their efficacy in
combatting unemployment overturned. Reassuring as this may be, general conclusions
cannot be based on the results presented. Sensitivity analysis taylored to the problem at
hand must remain a standard element of policy evaluations.